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I. INTRODUCTION
Game theoretic approaches to the study of electricity mar-
kets have been explored for decades [2], [7], [10]. Recently
problems associated with variations of the optimal power flow
problem with static (inelastic) demand for an electrical power
grid [5], [21], [22], have been considered by several authors,
e.g., [15], [17]. Indeed, demand elasticity for electricity is
motivated by the onset of potentially enormous load from plug-
in electric and hybrid-electric vehicles, see e.g., [1], [14] and
the references therein.
We consider a noncooperative, iterated Bertrand-type game
played by the generators based on information from the grid
(independent system operator (ISO)). That is, the grid is as-
sumed to provide sufficient information so that the generators
can modify their prices to improve upon their net utility.
The game is a “discriminatory” sealed-bid auction in that
the generators earn at the price they bid but in a quantity
determined by the ISO [7], [10]. To simplify matters herein,
we do not consider strategic bidding by the generators wherein
they may infer demand and/or the bidding strategies of their
competitors via a probabilistic model, nor multipart bidding to
account for start-up/ramp-up costs, secure contracts involving
minimum and maximum supply per generator, and the like1,
nor peak-power consumption penalties [8], [11]. Also, we
assume a continuously differentiable and convex cost of supply
[2], quadratic in particular. Also, rather than demand-side
bidding, we assume a simple “passive” linear demand response
based on average cost of supply, i.e., the ISO ensures that its
customers pay the same rates irrespective of their location or
demand volume.
Here we attempt to understand demand-response on the
wholesale (generation-level) market2. As such, we are focusing
here on how a demand-response consumers (load) can influ-
ence the wholesale generation market [4], [20].
In summary, in this paper, we are interested in studying
the optimum power-flow (economic dispatch) in the presence
of flexible elastic demand for a mean clearing-price based
This work supported by NSF grant SaTC 1228717. An earlier conference
version of this paper, focusing on commodity flow experimentation, appeared
in Proc. USENIX Feedback Computing, Philadelphia, June 2014.
1For example, in [21], an affine single-part bid and associated “uplift”
payments that are part of a joint integer-programming unit commitment and
continuous-linear optimal power flow (OPF, or “economic dispatch”) problem
was considered.
2Again, simplified here by not considering generation constraints and costs
of ramp-up in day-ahead provisioning, and associated reliability issues.
marketplace, assuming the generators are free to set their
prices; however in so doing energy demand will change. We
formulate a noncooperative game involving
• generators (suppliers, wholesalers) of a single commodity
(electricity) as players,
• a retailer-distributor (grid, ISO) that merely delivers suf-
ficient information to the supplier-players to act to reach
a Nash equilibrium, and
• consumers (individual loads) who are also informed by
the ISO of the current spot clearing prices for power, of
course.
Consistent with an ISO, we assume that the retailer/distributor
controls the conduits of supply.
In this setting, by numerically studying the relatively simple
benchmark IEEE 9-bus system, we found that even for a
generation duopoly with neither transmission-capacity bounds
nor thermal losses, and quadratic (continuous) cost of supply
under DC approximation, there is a surprising plurality of
Nash equilibria and surprisingly complex dynamics. Similar
non-convergent/unstable phenomena were also mentioned in
[5], [13], [18]. Although our model resembles a Bertrand game
by letting customers respond to the prices offered by suppliers,
the result of our experiment is not a typical Bertrand outcome,
i.e., the outcome of a competition wherein no competitor earns
a profit. This is largely due to the strictly convex, instead of
linear, form of generation cost and the guarantee of a minimum
allocated amount of power generation for each generator.
In all of our numerical experiments, we found a desirable
interior Nash equilibria with equal prices and equal power-
generation allocations for generators.
II. PROBLEM SET-UP
Consider a retailer with suppliers and consumers of a single
commodity. As in [17], supposing that each supplier g∈G sets
its own price pg$ per unit commodity. We model aggregate
consumer demand to be linear in response to clearing price,
P3
D(P) = (Dmax−Dmin)(1− PPmax ) + Dmin, (1)
where Dmin represents inflexible demand.
Suppose that suppliers have strictly convex cost of supply,
3Herein, just the mean price of supply.
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e.g., quadratic cost4, so that the net utility/revenue5 so that the
gth supplier’s net utility is
ug(p) = pgSg(p)− cg(Sg(p)) = pgSg(p)−agS2g(p), (2)
with different suppliers/generators g having different ag cost
parameters.
We assume that supply allocations are the result of the
optimization of a supply network by a mathematical program.
In electricity markets, the retailer is sometimes also the distri-
bution system. Consider power flow in a power system with
the bus set B and branch set R.
• Let G ⊂ B be the set of generator buses g, having gen-
erated power Sg, price per unit supply pg, and minimum
and maximum supply S(min)g and S
(max)
g respectively.
• Let L ⊂ B be the set of load buses l, having a demand
Dl that depends on the clearing price P.
• For each bus b ∈ B, θb is its voltage angle.
• Finally, let ri, j be the branch connecting buses bi and b j,
with reactance of the branch xi, j, Pi, j power “flowing”
from b j to bi (neglecting power loss on the transmission
line, we get Pi, j = −Pj,i), and the maximum tolerable
power on the branch ci, j.
A. Optimal power flow problem formulation
Assuming fixed generation prices p, and associated clear-
ing price P, the total consumer demand is given by (1).
The individual consumer demands (loads) are assumed to
be some fixed proportion of the total demand, i.e., Dl(P) =
αl D(P), ∀l ∈ L, where αl > 0 and ∑
l∈L
αl = 1. The ISO/retailer
solves a constrained optimization problem in order to find
S = [S1, . . . ,S|G|], the optimum power generating assignment
for the generators, and θ= [θ1, . . . ,θ|B|], the voltage angles on
the buses, which minimize the charges by the generators. The
constrained optimization problem is thus given by:
min
S,θ ∑g∈G
pgSg
such that:
Pi, j =
1
xi, j
(θ j − θi) (DC approximation [22])
Sg = ∑
k∈B
Pk,g, ∀g ∈ G (power generation)
Dl = ∑
k∈B
Pl,k, ∀l ∈ L (consumer demand)
S(min)g ≤ Sg ≤ S(max)g , ∀g ∈ G (supplier limits)
−ci, j ≤ Pi, j ≤ ci, j, ∀i, j ∈ B (branch limits)
(3)
4We assumed quadratic cost of supply for tractability of the duopoly studied
in [13]. An alternative cost structure could be asymptotic to a maximum, e.g.,
c(0)/(s−smax) where c(0) is the cost of keeping the generator/supplier online
even if zero supply is being delivered. In this paper, we do not consider ramp
up/ramp-down constraints for generators/suppliers.
5If the net consumer utility is collectively V (D)−PD, then for this linear
demand-response to price (1), the utility is quadratic, concave and increasing,
V (D) = (Pmax/2)(D2max− (Dmax−D)2)/(Dmax−Dmin) for Dmin ≤D≤Dmax.
Neglecting the power loss in generation and transmission, we
have ∑
g∈G
Sg = ∑
l∈L
Dl .
In the above formulation, we used fixed upper and lower
bounds on the supply allocations Sg. Alternatively, a quadratic
penalty term in the utility function (2) can serve as a “soft”
penalty (cost) on the supply allocation. For a positive ag and
fixed supplier prices p, suppose supplier g wants to ensure that
its utility function is never smaller than some positive value
u(min)g , then this imposes lower and upper bounds on its supply
allocation, given by
1
2ag
(pg−
√
p2g−4agu(min)g )≤ Sg≤
1
2ag
(pg+
√
p2g−4agu(min)g ),
provided the supplier price satisfies the condition pg ≥
2
√
agu
(min)
g . If uming = 0, then we observe that as ag is made
larger, i.e., as the cost of supply allocation increases, the
maximum supply allocation (or capacity) decreases, and vice-
versa.
In practice for power-transmission circuits, thermal losses
may determine edge (transmission line) capacities and costs,
the latter typically in a power-flow dependent fashion, e.g.,
“I2R” losses (Sec. 3.1 of [22]). In order to focus on the bidding
behavior among the generators, we neglect the power loss on
the transmission lines; hence the cost in power transmission
is also neglected.
B. Set-up of suppliers’ iterative game on a platform of demand
response
We neither assume that each supplier’s cost of production
is known to the retailer (i.e., the ag terms), nor, equivalently,
that the retailer chooses its allocations to the suppliers based
on this (as in [17]). In the following, denote as S(D(P), p) the
solution of the above optimal power flow allocation problem
to determine supply allocations for fixed demands (which are
based on the clearing price P) D(P)= {D j(P) | j∈ J} and fixed
supplier prices p = {pg |g ∈ G}. We propose the following
iterative supplier game wherein, for fixed supplier prices, the
clearing price and the consumer demands are adjusted itera-
tively until they converge to a fixed point. Then each supplier
g ∈ G adjusts its price pg, given the current price for all
other suppliers p−g, such that its utility function ug(pg, p−g)
is increased. Given initial prices set by the suppliers p, the
iterative supplier game proceeds as follows:
1) The retailer/ISO sets an initial mean price of supply
(clearing price charged to all consumers), P, say just as
the mean of the initial supplier prices, pg, ∀g ∈ G.
2) Determine the price-dependent consumer demands
D(P), where D j(P) = α j D(P), ∀ j ∈ J.
3) Retailer solves the economic dispatch optimal power
flow allocation problem S(D(P), p) given fixed demands
D and generation/supply costs p.
4) Retailer computes a new mean (clearing) price of supply,
P = ∑
g∈G
Sg pg/∑
g∈G
Sg.
5) If the change in clearing price P is significant (larger
than some threshold), then go back to Step 2; else
continue to Step 6.
6) For the current set of supplier prices, consistent supply
allocations, consumer demands, and clearing price have
been found. Now each supplier sets a new price of
supply such that there is an increase in its utility function
using one of the following two approaches:
(i) Best-response play action: Each supplier g sets a new
price of supply based on (an estimate of)6
argmax
pg
pg Sg(pg; p−g) − cg(Sg(pg; p−g)), (4)
where cg(x) is the cost of supply (assumed = agx2
above).
(ii) Better-response play action: Each supplier g calcu-
lates approximate left and right partial derivatives of its
utility function with respect to its price pg, i.e.,
∆u+g =
ug(pg+ ε, p−g)−ug(pg, p−g)
ε
∆u−g =
ug(pg, p−g)−ug(pg− ε, p−g)
ε
,
where ε ↘ 07. If the left and right derivatives have
different signs (a non-differentiable point), then there are
two possibilities. If ∆u−g > 0 and ∆u+g < 0, the current
price pg is a local maximum and there is no need to
change pg. If ∆u−g < 0 and ∆u+g > 0, the current price
is a local minimum. In this case, we increase pg by a
small value ζ if |∆u+g | > |∆u−g |; otherwise we decrease
pg by ζ. In case the derivatives have the same sign (may
still be a non-differentiable point), we increase pg by ζ
if both derivatives are positive and decrease pg by ζ if
both derivatives are negative. The step ζ should increase
the price by a small value such that there is an increase
in the value of the utility function. It should not make
large changes to the price like the best-response play
action8.
7) Exit if there is no change in the supplier prices (i.e., if
an equilibrium set of prices is obtained); Else go back
to Step 1.
Even for simple power circuits, the best-response iterated
play may lead to convergence problems including limit-cycle
behavior (cf., Section III). Alternatively, the suppliers could
play the iterated better-response non-cooperative game, possi-
bly with more reliable convergence properties [12], [19].
6Since a closed-form solution to the objective is not found, we use a small
positive step-size to directly search for optimal prices within their defined
range.
7We chose a value of ε= 10−6.
8We chose ζ as follows. Starting with a small trial value of ζ= 0.005 pg, if
ug(pg +ζ, p−g) > ug(pg, p−g) we accept the value of ζ, else ζ is decreased
by a factor of 2 iteratively until ug(pg +ζ, p−g)> ug(pg, p−g).
Given global knowledge of the retailer’s supply conduits9,
each supplier can compute its “best-response” prices in Step 6
leading to a Nash equilibrium. Alternatively, the retailer may
not explicitly divulge its system state (just as the cost of supply
is not known to the retailer in our set-up) and compute the
revenue function fg(pg) = pg Sg(pg; p−g) for each supplier g∈
G, again assuming p−g fixed from the previous iteration.
Note how this algorithm depends on forecasts of demand
for the upcoming epoch (which needs to be long enough to
accommodate the ramp-up/down delays of the generators).
Day-ahead forecasts [16] could be used to inform the initial
prices set by the generators.
III. NUMERICAL STUDY
We study the iterative generation game described in section
II-B with a 9-bus power system that has three generators and
three loads as shown in Fig. 1. We consider the scenario where
cost of delivering power is zero, and the branch capacities are
set to fixed values.
Generator 1 Generator 3
Generator 2
Bus 1 Bus 4 Bus 6 Bus 3
Bus 5
Bus 2
Bus 7
Bus 8
Bus 9
Fig. 1. IEEE 9-bus system used in our study with three generators and three
loads
For the benchmark IEEE 9-bus system [23], the maximum
and minimum power generated by the three generators are
set to [250,300,270]MW and [10,10,10]MW, respectively.
The constants in D(P), our model for the total consumer
demand, were chosen as the possible maximum/minimum
power provided by the generators, that is, Dmax = 770MW,
Dmin = 30MW (note that, although generator 2 can generate
300MW, the capacity of the branch connecting bus 2 and
bus 8 is only 250MW, therefore generator 2 can only pro-
vide 250MW at most). The total consumer demand D(P) is
assumed to be proportionally divided among the individual
loads, i.e., αl = 1|L| , ∀l ∈ L. The maximum clearing price, Pmax,
is set to 5; for clearing prices P > Pmax, the flexible demand
is 0. The reactance of the transmission line is based on the
9Again, the motivating example here is a power system retailer/ISO
which owns and operates the grid connecting generators/suppliers to
loads/consumers.
data from [6]. The constants (ag) in the utility function (2) of
generators are set to 0.009, 0.01, and 0.018 respectively.
1) Best response game with three players: Assume all three
generators participate. By choosing different starting points,
we have both convergent and non-convergent trajectories, as
shown below.
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3
3.5
4
4.5
5
starting:[4.98,3.1,2.38]
starting:[4.23,2.52,3.31]
p1
starting:[3.15,2.8,3.15]
ending:[3.15,3.15,3.15]
ending:[3.13,3.13,3.13]
ending:[3.11,3.11,3.11]
starting:[3.11,3.45,4.88]
starting:[2.01,2.51,2.33]
starting:[1.27,1.49,1.68]
p2
p 3
Fig. 2. The three-player best-response trajectories which start from different
initial prices and end up with equilibrium points.
In Fig. 2, these trajectories will finally converge to
definite points. For most initial generator prices, the
limit pricing point is [3.15,3.15,3.15], however there
are several exceptions. For example, trajectories start-
ing from [3.11,3.45,4.88] and [3.15,2.8,3.15] converge to
[3.11,3.11,3.11] and [3.13,3.13,3.13], respectively. We found
that when the prices fall at the points along the line from
[2.61,2.61,2.61] to [3.15,3.15,3.15], all the generator will
keep their prices unchanged, which means, once a trajectory
intersects with this line, it terminates at the intersection point
(convergence occurs). At these equal-prices equilibrium points,
there are equal power allocations S to the generators.
On the other hand, we also found some best-response
trajectories which do not converge, as shown in Fig. 3, because
of the finite step-size when searching for optimal prices, given
the current prices of other generators (Step 6 in cf., Section
II-B). In our numerical experiments, we set the step-size to
0.01.
2) Best response game with two players: By fixing the price
of generator 3 to 5, we can focus on the best-response game
between generators 1 and 2, and plot the trajectory in a two-
dimensional plane. Similar to three-player best-response, we
also found both convergent and non-convergent trajectories.
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2.9
2.95
3
3.05
3.1
3.15
3.2
starting:[3.15,2.9,3.15]
p1
starting:[3.15,3,3.15]
starting:[3.15,3.1,3.15]
swinging between [3.11,3.1,3.11] and [3.1,3.11,3.11]
swinging between [3.01,3,3.01] and [3,3.01,3.01]
swinging between [2.91,2.9,2.91] and [2.9,2.91,2.91]
p2
p 3
Fig. 3. The three-player best-response trajectories which end up oscillating
between two points.
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
starting:[1.27,1.49]
ending:[3.34,3.34]
starting:[2.01,2.51]
starting:[4.01,3.99]
starting:[4.13,4.12]
starting:[4.23,2.52]
starting:[1.98,4.22]
p1
p 2
Fig. 4. The two-player best-response trajectories which start from different
points and converge to the same point.
However, our numerical results presented in Fig. 4 show
that, unlike the games with three players, the best-response
games with two competitors, if convergent, will converge to
the point (3.34,3.34,3.34)).
Moreover, non-convergent phenomena in the two-player
best-response game are more manifest than in the three-player
game. As demonstrated in Fig. 5, the amplitude of oscillation,
compared with 2 players, is much larger. Also, unlike the non-
convergent cases in the three-player game, decreasing the step
length will not shorten the oscillation amplitude.
3.05 3.1 3.15 3.2 3.25 3.3 3.35 3.4 3.45 3.5
3.05
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starting:[3.11,3.45]
swinging between[3.11,3.34] and [3.34,3.11]
starting:[3.2,3.4]
swinging between[3.2,3.34] and [3.34,3.2]
starting:[3.4,3.3]
swinging between[3.34,3.3] and [3.3,3.34]
p1
p 2
Fig. 5. The two-player best-response trajectories which start from different
points and end up oscillating between two points.
3) Better response game with two players: We simulate
two-player better-response game, an alternative approach,
which avoids the oscillatory behavior of the best-response
game. The quiver plot shown in Fig. 6 can visualize the dy-
namics of better-response iterated play microscopically. Note
that we have set an upper bound price to 5, otherwise prices
will diverge from an infinitely large set of initial prices. This is
because we set a minimum power allocation for each generator
in our optimal power flow calculation, i.e., the generators
always have some power to generate, no matter how high
the prices are. However, such minimum allocated amounts of
generation power typically are not guaranteed irrespective of
price in practice.
Based on the quiver plot shown in Fig. 6, we conjecture that
trajectories starting from some area (most likely the lower left
area) will converge to an interior NEP, while those starting
from the other area will converge to the boundary (points
where either p1 or p2 is 5), as demonstrated in Fig. 7. Note
that, in our experiment, the better-response trajectories with an
interior NEP actually do not converge, but arrive at small limit
cycles because of finite step-size for search, recall footnote 8.
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